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Although they have a long Western history, philo-
sophical and otherwise, binary oppositions are not by 
any means endemic to the Western world. They are 
pan-cullural phenomena. The purpose of this paper, 
however, is to examine a fundamental binary opposition 
that, in its mode of expression in Western culture, is 
endemic: the human/nonhuman opposition. Its 
indigenous signature is readily apparent in the fact that 
it subsumes other oppositions basic to Western ways of 
thinking. Subsumed in its compass are the oppositions 
nature/culture, mind/body, thinking/doing, reason/ 
emotion. Subsumed also are subsidiary oppositions, 
ones having to do generally with behavior or behavioral 
capability ascriptions such as learned/instinctual, future 
planning/immediate action, articulate/mute, and the like. 
Following a brief historical introduction, what the 
examination will show first, in a quite summary way, 
is how the subsumption works; what it will show second 
is how the fundamental binary opposition is an ordering 
principle of thought that is inconsistently applied and 
that disregards a basic tenet of evolutionary theory; what 
it will show third is how the categorical and uneven 
opposition is evidentially unsound, myopically 
self-serving, and for philosophers especially, a 
particularly thin justification for cherishing their species. 
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I 
To set the nOlion of binary opposition in brief historical 
perspective and to clarify the nature of the opposition 
in question, we can recall Aristotle's specification of 
four senses of the term "opposite": 
1. one thing may be correlatively opposed to 
something else, as the knower is to the known; 
2. one thing may be the contrary of another, as odd 
is to even, though intermediates between extremes 
may obtain, as in the contraries "good" and "bad"; 
3. one term can signify a deficiency or privation in 
reference to something naturally possessed, as 
blindness in relation to sight; 
4. statements may oppose one another by affmning 
one thing true and its opposite false, as in "he is 
human"/"he is nonhuman.'" 
The particular kind of opposition of moment here is of 
both the second and fourth kind: the second kind in 
that the oppositional distinction sets up contrasting 
conceptual categories with no intermediates, the fourth 
kind in that the oppositional distinction in propositional 
form affmns truth and falsity. Thus, one is either hwnan 
or nonhuman; there are no in-betweens and a state-
ment to one effect-"they are human" or "they are 
nonhuman"---entails the falsity of its opposite. Similarly 
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with the other oppositions. Here too there are no 
in-betweens, and a statement affmning the one of any 
pair is a denial of its opposite. 
According to Western doctrine, humans are 
distinguished by their culture, their minds, their 
reasoning, and their thinking, nonhumans by the 
conceptual antithesis of each of these categories. It is 
not that humans do not have anything natural about 
them, that they do not have bodies, that they do not 
have capabilities to do as well as to think, that they do 
not have emotions; it is that in the axiological scheme 
of the four oppositions, these commonly conceived 
possessions are of inestimably lesser significance and 
value than their opposites. Indeed, they would not in 
any preeminent sense be characterized as the natural 
possessions of humans. Culture, mind, thinking, and 
reasoning are the natural possessions of humans, just 
as nature, body, doing, and emotion are the natural 
possessions of nonhumans. The same axiological 
scheme obtains in binary oppositions having to do with 
behavioral ascriptions. It is humans who, in virtue of 
their humanness, are capable of planning ahead, for 
example; it is they who devise strategies for the future 
and who do not live simply in the moment. In contrast, 
it is nonhumans who are present-oriented, who grab 
whatever is at hand, and who, "if something starts 
hurting," as Dennett puts it, "'know enough' to 
withdraw, but that is the best they can do."2 Not only 
are the lines clearly drawn to begin with, but they are 
clearly drawn successively along a considerable number 
ofbinary oppositions following upon the first. In effect, 
to be human is to occupy an invariably privileged, not 
to say exalted, position in a world of otherwise merely 
nonhuman creatures. In tum, a "hallowed gap"-to 
borrow a phrase from Richard Dawkins-is forged in 
the spectrum of animate life.3 
II 
Evolutionary theory is based on an abundance of 
evidence showing historical continuities among 
creatures all the way from species similarities-e.g., 
all hominids are consistently bipedal-to phylum 
similarities-e.g., all creatures who have backbones 
(fish, amphibians, reptiles, avians, mammals) belong 
to the phylum "Chordata." Such continuities demand 
careful attention with respect to the human/nonhuman 
opposition, and this for two reasons in particular that 
will be considered here. The first of these concerns the 
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fact that although all humans are hominids, not all 
hominids are human. Many of our direct hominid 
ancestors, individuals belonging to the genus Homo, 
made stone tools and/ or buried their dead. Not 
belonging to either the species Homo sapiens or HOl1W 
sapiens sapiens, however, they were nonhuman. How 
are we to view them within the fundamental human/ 
nonhuman opposition? How can we possibly fit them 
within one or the other category? Moreover, how do 
we apportion them "mental credit" in terms of culture, 
mind, thinking, and reasoning? If the answer is "On 
the basis of behaviors attested to by fossil and artifactual 
remains," the answer is defective. It is defective because 
the categorical standards are inconsistently applied. 
Culture, mind, thinking, and reasoning are commonly 
honorific epithets reserved for humans and apportioned 
in miserly fashion, if at all, outside a human circle. They 
are thus not commonly awarded on the basis of such 
specific nonhuman practices as termite fishing, the 
Tanzsprache, hand-clasp-grooming, nest cleanliness, 
bower-building, or the washing of sweet potatoes.4 If 
they are not awarded to chimpanzees who fashion sticks 
for digging out termites, honeybees who kinetically 
transcribe direction with respect to the sun into gravity 
with respect to a hive, and so on, then on what grounds 
should tlley be awarded to nonhuman hominid makers 
of stone tools or to nonhuman hominids who buried 
their dead? Simply on the grounds that we know what 
species those creatures evolved into? If so, then it is 
sheer favoritism that justifies the ascriptions, a 
favoritism which, even if not sheer, hardly serves as a 
valid justification. In particular, even if bolstered by 
something like a sociobiological explanation that 
declares the exclusivity of the epithets justified on the 
basis of adaptation-<Jur genes lead us conceptually to 
protect and privilege our own kind, hence to protect 
and privilege those who passed on their genes in a 
comparatively direct manner to us-the favoritism is 
little more than a convenient sanctioning device, to be 
applied whenever and wherever humans are called upon 
to justify the morality of their interspecies behaviors. 
Such selective affirmations and denigrations of 
evolutionary relationships guarantee an ever-ready 
ladder of evolutionary life with humans at the top. 
"[T]he traditional summum bonum of bigger brains"5 
dominates all from on high, even though, as Stephen 
Jay Gould has pointed out, the world of living creatures 
has been, is, and probably always will be, most properly 
characterized as The Age of Bacteria.6 
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There is a further inconsistency in pointing to the 
archaeological record to detennine how mental credit 
should be apportioned, but an inconsistency of a quite 
different kind insofar as the treasured epithets are 
withheld from ascription to some hominids even while 
they are awarded to others who lived both earlier and 
later. Mental acuities thus appear, disappear, and then 
reappear in the course of hominid evolution. In 
particular, Neandertals are viewed by some paleo-
anthropologists as thoroughly nonhuman, that is, as 
lacking the positively valorized natural intelligence of 
hominids up to that point in time. Homo habilis, the 
[lIst stone tool-making hominid species, for example, 
and even earlier, Australopithecus afarensis, the first 
bipedal hominid species, are both regularly lauded and 
cherished by all paleoanthropologists as our ancestors 
precisely on the grounds of their revolutionary new 
practices, practices mentally credited in such estimable 
ways as "being able to see to greater distances," "freeing 
the hands for tool-making," "replacing teeth with 
tools," and the like. We shall turn to the inconsistent 
judgment of Neandertals in more detail after 
considering the second reason for taking evolutionary 
continuities seriously. 
Evolutionary theory teaches that nothing de novo 
arises in nature. Accordingly, culture, mind, thinking, 
and reasoning did not suddenly arrive on the scene deus 
ex mnchina; they evolved. Though Darwin's insistence 
on the evolution of mental powers, thus on mental 
continuities, goes virtually unacknowledged (and 
virtually uncontested in any scholarly sense, whether 
because of ignorance of his writings or neglect of the 
pertinent sources), there is no doubt but that his notion 
of evolution was wholistic: not merely physical bodies 
evolved; intact creatures-"persistent wholes"-
evolved.7 Hence Darwin's forthright concern with 
mental powers-with attention, reasoning, memory, 
curiosity, imitation, and so on, and their evolution. 
Received Western wisdom that insists humans are 
thoroughly unique in virtue of their cultures, their 
minds, their thinking, and their reasoning insists on 
discontinuities and feeds in some instances on peculiar 
evolutionary ideas, indeed at times with the result that 
humanness appears so special it exceeds the bounds of 
a natural history. Thus in present-day philosophical 
literature, we find the idea that humanness was a matter 
of "one or two mutant nen'ous systems" having 
"higher-order capacities" that "would have proliferated 
like crazy."g Now of course there is no doubt that 
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mutations exist in nature; but there is also no doubt that 
they are usually detrimental if not lethal. As one 
commonly used biology text points out, "This is not 
surprising. Ifone were to change a word at random in a 
Shakespearean sonnet or a wire at random in a television 
set, an improvement would be unlikely, and the results 
might well be disastrous."9 Of the types of mutation 
known, moreover, additions (and deletions) are the most 
harmful.10 Taken seriously nonetheless, the idea that 
human minds were produced by "a few mutations... 
that would enhance... reproductive fitness"U severs at 
a stroke any ties that might bind humans and their 
culture, minds, thinking, or reasoning to other creatures; 
it cuts humans off from the rest of the animate world. 
In short, "higher-order capacities" are not viewed as 
having any substantive evolutionary Le., historical, 
relationship to (whatever might be said to constitute) 
"lower-order capacities. " Higher-order capacities owe 
their existence not to evolution-to descent with 
modifi,cation12-but to "one or two mutant nervous 
systems." With these one or two mutant systems, a 
Rubicon is crossed, and lo! what is essentially non-
human becomes essentially human. 
III 
For the past years, a controversy has been growing as to 
how modern-day humans are related to Neandertals. Did 
they replace Neandertals, or are Neandertals the direct 
ancestor of humans of European and Western Asian 
descent? In other words, did modern humans arise "out 
of Africa" and in time spread from there allover the 
world, overcoming Neandertals in the process, or did 
they evolve multi-regionally from the stock of hominids 
already existing multi-regionally, hominids such as 
Neandertals in Europe and Western Asia? The interest in 
the question for a philosopher lies not in helping 
paleoanthropologists sort out their thinking on the 
matter,13 though in one area some clarification-not of 
necessity demanding the skills of a philosopher-is 
certainly required.14 The interest lies rather in the 
opportunity to inform oneselfof two major and obviously 
related liabilities in making evolutionary claims: an 
evolutionarily unenlightened predilection for taking the 
human/ nonhuman opposition to be categorically 
absolute; and a predilection for evolutionarily untenable 
mind-pops-suddenly-into-place scenarios. Each of these 
liabilities can be succinctly illustrated by considering 
one well-known stand on the controversy. 
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When British paleoanthropologist Christopher 
Stringer and archaeologist Clive Gamble argue for the 
replacement theory-early modern humans supplanted 
Neandertals with no interbreeding-they do so in 
terms of there being a sudden onset of "symbolic 
behaviour," a "flick of the switch."15 Prior to the flick, 
there was no symbolic behavior but only the mindless 
repetition of behavioral forms. "The Ancients" 
(Neandertals) are thus distinguished from "the 
Moderns" (Homo sapiens) by their lack of culture, 
mind, thinking, and reasoning. While the distinction 
might seem to vindicate the existence of a Rubicon 
since it is offered by evolutionary scientists, it does 
not. Stringer and Gamble are precisely unaware of 
symbolic behavior documented in primate species 
other than humans, let alone aware of any unresolved 
debate about whether the Tanzsprache is a form of 
symbolic behavior or of the idea that corporeal 
representation is a biological matrix. 16 Their judgment 
about Neandertals' lack of "symbolic behaviour" is 
summed up in their statement concerning a "capacity 
for emulation, for change, but not for symbolism." 
They say ftrst that, "while they [Neandertals] could 
emulate they could not fully understand," and then 
immediately add that "We suspect, for example, that 
the structures at Molodova and Arcy-sur-Cure more 
resembled 'nests' than the symbolic 'homes' of the 
Moderns at Kostenki or Dolni Vestonice."17 Their 
derisive, clearly nonhuman judgment of Neandertal 
dwellings (and tools) more or less matches their 
derisive, nonhuman judgment of Neandertallanguage.18 
In brief, whatever the Neandertals did, it lacked any 
sign of the "mental essence"19 that is the ne plus ultra 
of humanness. 
To chart an absolute divide between humans and 
nonhumans as Stringer and Gamble do is evidentially 
unsound both because it afftrms a Rubicon and thus 
denies evolutionary continuities and because, as noted 
above, it ignores evidence of culture, mind, thinking, 
and reasoning in nonhuman animals. This evidence may 
be summarized as follows: 
Culture: PrimatologistW. C. McGrew addresses the 
question critically and in detail of whether chimpanzees 
have culture. He uses grooming behavior as a model, 
consulting two longitudinally studied East African 
chimpanzee groups (living in Kasoje and Gombe, 
respectively) that are genetically undifferentiated from 
each other. He points out that the particular and unusual 
style of grooming-the grooming-hand-clasp---that is 
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typical for the one group of chimpanzees is totally 
absent in the other group. After examining possible 
explanations on the grounds of different environmental 
selection pressures-parasite infestation, for example-
and after detailed further investigations with respect to 
criteria for culture, he states: 
Suppose that the grooming-hand-clasp had 
been described by someone like E. T. Hall for 
a human society in East Africa. Suppose that 
he presented ethnographic data exactly as here, 
contrasting the gestural repertoires of two 
neighboring cultures. It would be accorded 
cultural status without questioning, and would 
dutifully be coded into the Human Relations 
Area File [an ongoing, world-wide research 
index of every human behavior, belief, 
practice, ritual, etc. recorded and studied by 
anthropologists] to be used in future cross-
cultural analyses. Where does this leave the 
chimpanzees of Kasoje and Kanyawara [the 
only other group of chimpanzees observed to 
practice hand-clasp grooming, but not studied 
longitudinally] ?20 
Mind: Kanzi is a chimpanzee who comprehends 
spoken English at the level of a 2 1/2 year old human 
child.21 He learned English spontaneously when, for 
the ftrst two-and-a-half years of his life, he observed 
experimenters attempting to teach English to his mother, 
who was unable to comprehend the symbols used to 
teach the language. His comprehension is of particular 
interest in light of more than 40 years of research on 
human speech perception which shows it to be 
dependent upon speech production.22 The linkage is 
causatively explained in terms of "an analogue of the 
production process-an internal, innately specifted 
vocal-tract synthesizer... that incorporates complete 
information about the anatomical and physiological 
characteristics of the vocal tract and also about the 
articulatory and acoustic consequences of linguistically 
significant gestures."23 In short, a "language module" 
in the brain decodes the speaker's speech and in fact 
distinguishes linguistically signiftcant gestures from 
non-linguistic ones. Clearly, Kanzi does not have "an 
internal, innately specified vocal-tract synthesizer... 
that incorporates complete information about the 
anatomical and physiological characteristic of the vocal 
tract" since not only does he not have a human brain, 
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he does not have a human body, Le., a human anatomy 
and physiology. The question of how it is he learned to 
comprehend normal English sentences on the order of 
"Get your ball" or even "Put the lemon in the water" and 
quite outlandish sentences on the orderof"Can you throw 
a potato at the turtle?,,24 must thus look to quite other 
understandings ofhis abilities. For those understandings 
to be consistent with standard understandings, one must 
of course take into account that by common everyday 
human standards, whoever comprehends a verbal 
language is ipso facto accorded a mind. 
Thinking:25 Zoologist's Bernd Heinrich's experi-
mental study of ravens shows them capable of solving 
a complicated food procurement problem, thus, as 
would typically be said of humans, capable of thinking. 
The ravens determined how a piece of meat that was 
attached to a twenty-five inch long string attached to 
their perch could be secured. As Heinrich observes, "to 
obtain the meat a bird would have to land on the perch 
above it, reach down with its bill, pull up a loop of 
string, step onto the string to anchor it, release the bill, 
reach down again to pull up another loop, and so on, in 
a repeating cycle of more than twenty steps until the 
meat was raised to the perch."26 What Heinrich found 
was that after approximately six hours, without any trial 
and error attempts. but with repeated glances at the 
meat "as though studying the situation,"27 the ravens 
secured the meat. Heinrich's conclusion: ravens are 
intelligent and capable of insight. 
Reasoning: Sextus Empiricus cites Chrysippus's 
account of a dog that, "arriving at a spot where three 
ways meet, after smelling at the two roads by which 
the quarry did not pass, ... rushes off at once by the 
third without stopping to smell."28 This same kind of 
"implicit reasoning"29 is twice described by Darwin, 
once with respect to a retriever who could not carry 
back two birds at the same time, so killed one, took the 
frrst back, then returned for the second dead one.3D In 
the course of giving concrete examples of reasoning 
in nonhuman animals, Darwin cites the aphorism of 
South American muleteers to the effect that'" I will 
not give you the mule whose step is easiest, but la mas 
racional-the one that reasons best.'" Interestingly 
enough, he goes on immediately to cite A. von 
Humboldt's comment on the muleteers' aphorism: 
'" [T]his popular expression, dictated by long 
experience, combats the system ofanimated machines, 
better perhaps than all the arguments of speculative 
philosophy'" (italics added).3! Again, interestingly 
enough, Darwin points out that "Few persons any longer 
dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning" 
and notes by way of example that "Animals may 
constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve." 
He then makes the thought-provoking observation that 
"It is a significant fact, that the more the habits of any 
particular animal are studied by a naturalist, the more 
he attributes to reason and the less to unlearnt 
instincts."32 (We might recall in this context that 
Lamarck is judged to have failed to arrive at the 
principle of natural selection precisely because, rather 
than being in the field, in the woods, or at the shore, he 
was a philosophe du cabinet.)33 
At least two major implications for philosophers 
follow from the above examples. First, thinking is not 
tied exclusively to language. Nonlinguistic forms of 
thinking thus demand acknowledgment and attentive 
study. Second, nonhuman animals are represented on 
each side of each of the oppositional divides-and so, 
of course, correlatively, are we humans. Thus not only 
are the divides suspect to begin with, but the axiological 
schemes that inform them are equally so. 
In sum, the fundamental binary opposition that 
categorically separates humans and nonhumans and 
that progressively orders much of Western human 
thought is countermanded by the evidence. A hard and 
fast division, however much believed in or yearned 
for, flies in the face of historical facts which support 
evolutionary continuities, and in the face of nonhuman 
animal research studies that support the same 
continuities. It even appears to fly in the face of 
everyday Western practices and transactions, 
especially those having to do with humans' exploi-
tatively grabbing whatever is at hand and not 
adequately devising strategies for the future. Indeed, 
perhaps "that is the best they can do." 
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